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Can Sweden Afford Another High Equity Premium?
Abstract
This paper calculates the empirical equity premium in Sweden between 1919-2006 and disaster probabilities
of 25% and 50% contractions in real Gross Domestic Product. The calculation puts the equity premium at
approximately 8%, 2% higher than what appears in the historical United States data, due to rare disaster events
outside and idiosyncratic to Sweden. This study makes two important contributions. First, it projects that
Sweden can afford the economic cost of another high equity premium but should remain cautious. Second,
this paper affirms that WWII increased investors' perceptions of future equity risk despite Sweden's neutrality.
To arrive at the empirical results this paper follows a distilled version of Barro (2006) written by Taub (2007).
The results stemming from this analysis help inform macroeconomic policy in Sweden.
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1 Introduction
The novel contribution of this paper is that I calculate the empirical equity premium in
Sweden at approximately 8%, and from this estimate my analysis of Swedish historical data
from 1919 to 2006 suggest rare disaster probabilities of 1.05% for a 50% contraction in real
GDP and similarly 13.73% for a 25% contraction. The research that I conduct is based
on Robert Barro’s (2006) theory that posits high observed equity premia are the oﬀspring
of rare macroeconomic shocks such as extreme events like wars, financial crises, or disease
pandemics. However, to arrive at the aforementioned empirical results I follow a distilled
version of Barro (2006) written by Bart Taub (2007). The results yield interesting insights
into the welfare and policy implications for Sweden in light of the United States financial
crisis: a series of economic hardships commencing with the burst of the United States housing
bubble in 2006, whose pernicious eﬀects have extended globally.
Although I wanted to study a country that Barro (2006) does not consider in his paper,
the asset data for exotic nations outside the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) is hard to acquire, in particular total stock returns for extended time
horizons. Instead, I chose Sweden for two compelling reasons. The first being because
of its non-alliance policy during World War II and I wondered if Sweden’s philosophy of
neutrality might exclude World War II as a rare disaster. The second reason is because
of its unique economic model in the post-World War II era known as the Swedish Model.
To illustrate, Sweden’s mixed economy, which has highly influenced political and economic
thinking in Western Europe since World War II, supports private enterprise directed by
strong government intervention to establish fair competition, low inflation, low levels of
unemployment, and social welfare benefits. This is in contrast to the free-market economy
of the United States, which until recently in 2008 has seen markets nearly unfettered since
the late 1970s.
However, there are signs that the Swedish people are growing wary of this idyllic economic
model. First, in the most recent elections held in September 2006, the Social Democratic
Party, which has led the government for 65 of the 76 years since 1932, lost a majority of its
seats which ended 12 consecutive years in oﬃce. The Social Democratic Party, whose political
ideology commits to social welfare programs and government direction of the economy, was
replaced by the Alliance for Sweden. This coalition of four center-right parties supports
increased free enterprise and less government intervention, while still supporting the social
welfare programs introduced by the Social Democrats.
The reason the political composition in Sweden is important to rare disasters is there
is much debate about which party’s economic policies contributed most to Sweden’s severe
financial crisis of the early 1990s. Those on the Right argue it was the internal failure
of the Keynesian-inspired macroeconomic Swedish Model, while those on the Left argue it
was external global pressure on the Swedish government to adapt capitalist interests in the
mid-1980s that lead to the early 1990s crisis. The debate remains controversial, however
the political landscape is important because the recent shift towards a less interventionist
economy could potentially be welfare worsening in Sweden.
1.1 Sweden’s Mixed Economy
Since the 1990s financial crisis, the Swedish economy has rebounded nicely, although recent
news indicate Sweden is headed towards a recession exacerbated by the current US financial
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crisis. Sweden is a highly industrialized nation and is export-oriented. Sweden’s extensive
forests, rich iron ore deposits and hydroelectric power are the natural resources, through
the application of modern information technology, that have enabled Sweden to become
highly focused on foreign trade. Along with it natural resources, Sweden has an excellent
and skilled labor force. Aided by its philosophies of peace, neutrality and extensive welfare
benefits, Sweden has achieved a high standard of living suggested through GDP per capita
(2008 est., purchasing power parity) of $39,600.
Economic growth has been strong in recent years, with an annual average real consump-
tion growth rate of 1.96% in 2004, 2.77% in 2005, and 1.79% in 2006. The Riksbank (Swedish
Central Bank) aims for 2% annual inflation, however this rate has not been achieved in re-
cent years. Inflation has not been as stable as GDP growth with an annual inflation rate of
0.403% in 2004, 0.422% in 2005, and 1.35% in 2006. In 2006 the unemployment rate reached
7.1%, but in 2007 it fell to 6.2%, and then rose to 9.3% in 2009. But questions remain unan-
swered. An analysis of the observed equity premia asks us to question the future stability of
Sweden’s prosperity. And from this discussion, we can look at what policy actions Sweden
should take to insure itself against the adverse global eﬀects of the US financial crisis. To
put it candidly, can the highly praised Swedish Model aﬀord the welfare cost of another high
equity premium?
1.2 Literature Review
The theory for this paper stems from Barro (2006). His model, an extension of Rietz (1988),
hypothesizes that the equity premium puzzle, first documented by Mehra and Prescott
(1985), can be explained by the potential for rare economic disasters to depress real GDP.
But, first, what is the equity premium puzzle? Historical data series show that the real rate
of return to holding and buying shares of stock is considerably larger than the real rate of
return to holding government bonds. To illustrate, Mehra and Prescott (1985) show that the
average annual yield on the Standard and Poors 500 index over the period 1889-1978 was
7%, while the average return on government bonds was less than 1%. Thus, the diﬀerence
of 6% is known as the observed equity premium: It is the amount that investors must be
compensated in the market for holding risky assets like shares of stock.
However, standard economic theory predicts that the equity premium ought to be minis-
cule, in most cases less than half a percentage point based on models of capital markets and
investor risk preferences. The dichotomy between the high observed equity premium and its
theoretical component is known as the “equity premium puzzle”. While Barro’s (2006) the-
ory has much credibility, there remains no accepted solution to the puzzle in the economics
profession.
Second, it is important to understand why the equity premium is important to macroeco-
nomic policy. First and foremost, the equity premium is about aggregate fluctuations in the
economy (Taub, 2007). However, Grant and Quiggin (2005) explain that scarce attention
has been given to the implications of the equity premium puzzle for resource allocation, wel-
fare or macroeconomic policy, irrespective of whichever model best solves the puzzle. They
believe this absence in the literature is disconcerting because they show that the size of the
equity premium has nontrivial macroeconomic policy implications. Their observation is that
the larger the equity premium, the larger the marginal value of recession-state income (i.e.
the average investor values an extra dollar earned in a recession more than he does during
an expansion), and thus the welfare cost of a recession is high.
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It follows then that the greater the disparity between the observed and theoretical equity
premium, then the more interventionist are the policy conclusions. While Lucas (1987)
remains steadfast in his position that the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations are trivial,
separate studies show that society is willing to relinquish large amounts of income to eliminate
systematic risk (i.e. systematic risk is risk in the market that cannot be diversified away like
recessions, wars, and rare disasters). For example, Barro (2009) estimates that society would
eagerly reduce real GDP by around 20% each year to eliminate rare disasters and Grant and
Quiggin (2005) calculate that society would willingly pay a premium of 15% of real GDP
to eliminate systematic risk. To sum up the importance of equity premia in macroeconomic
policy, Grant and Quiggin (2005) aver that a high equity premium induces an expensive cost
of recession and thus government intervention is potentially welfare improving.
2 Methodology
2.1 Theoretical vs. Empirical Equity Premia
To arrive at the theoretical and empirical equity premia and the rare disaster probabilities
I examine consumption and asset returns in a stochastic setting. The time series horizon
that I use is from 1919-2006. I believe that this time span is large enough to include one
of the rare disasters that the equity premium reflects. This time span captures the Great
Depression, World War II including the Midsummer Crisis of 1941, the oil embargo of the
1970s, and the Swedish financial crisis of the early 1990s. All regressions and calculations
are done on Microsoft Excel 2004, and all charts are created using the data I collected.
My first objective is to calculate the variance of Sweden’s growth rate. I collected private
final consumption data for 1919-2000 from Historical National Accounts for Sweden 1800-
2000 compiled by Rodney Edvinsson in his 2005 dissertation Growth, Accumulation, Crisis:
With New Macroeconomic Data for Sweden. The data are nominal values in purchasers’
prices. Edvinsson explains purchasers’ prices as “A type of price on a unit of good or
services produced as output, which includes the excess of indirect taxes over subsidies and
transport charges invoiced separately by the producer”. Consumption data for 2001-2006
are retrieved from the Swedish National Institute of Economic Research. Again, the data
are nominal values but are in constant prices. The compromise I make is that a majority
of the nominal final consumption is in terms of the producer’s consumption, while the last
six years are in terms of the consumer’s consumption. The price index I use is the CPI with
a base year of 1980. The CPI was retrieved from Global Financial Data. To calculate real
private final consumption I divided the nominal consumption at time t by the CPI at time
t. I then took the natural logarithm of each value to obtain ln(ct).
To observe the growth rate and the volatility of consumption over time I ran the regres-
sion ln(ct) = a + bt + et . Sweden’s growth rate over the period 1919-2006 is roughly 2.6%,
while the variance of the growth rate σ2e is 0.02062281. This variance is low and from this low
value the regression suggests that real consumption between 1919-2006 is not very volatile.
Sweden’s steady upward growth is seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Growth of Real Consumption, 1919-2006
The smooth growth trend indicates that stochastic shocks do not perturb private final
consumption greatly. In fact, the subtle concave shape of the trend suggests that Sweden is
tending towards a steady state of real consumption.
Next, I ran an autoregression of the log of real consumption ln(ct+1) = a+ b ln(ct)+ut to
calculate the variance of the residuals in order to calculate the theoretical equity premium,
which is derived as the equation λ = (γσ2u). The variance σ2u is 0.00182123. γ is the risk
aversion factor, and I use a conservative estimate of 4 as an assumption. I multiply the risk
aversion factor and the variance of the residuals to arrive at the theoretical equity premium
of λ = 0.00728494. The theoretical equity premium reflects a 0.728% return over riskless
assets that investors require if they anticipate no rare disasters. Clearly, this is not the case
as Barro (2006) claims because it is too low (it is not even 1%).
To find the empirical equity premium I used historical data on total stock returns and
short-run yields. I retrieved data on total stock returns from the Riksbank website. Currently
the Riksbank is undergoing a project to construct historical monetary statistics of Sweden
from 1668 onward, which provided me with a wealth of information on asset returns. The
compiler of all stock returns and short-run and long-run yields for this project is Daniel
Waldenstrom. I did not have to calculate a dividend adjustment because the composite
stock return index has dividends reinvested from 1919 onwards based on end-of-the months
quotes on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Also, I did not have to adjust for inflation because
Waldenstrom has the total stock return in real values. I could not have been more fortunate
then to find real stock returns that include reinvested dividends on top of capital gains in
order to save myself the cumbersome trouble of having to adjust stock prices for dividends
and inflation.
To calculate total stock returns I calculate ln(pt+1/pt) where pt denotes the dividend
and inflation adjusted total stock return at time t. To find the empirical rate of return on
stocks, denoted re, I take the arithmetic average from 1920 to 2006 and get 0.102289, which
is 10.2289%. Waldenstrom observes that real stock prices were largely constant up to 1980,
but the increase after 1980 is unprecedented. This exponential growth can bee seen in Figure
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2 below. This observation is important later when I discuss the equity premium.
Figure 2: Stockholm Composite Stock Return Index, 1919-2006
To find returns on relatively riskless assets I look at short-term government bonds. In
particular, the Swedish short-term risk free rate is measured as the discount rate of the
Riksbank from 1856-1982 and as the Swedish 30-day Treasury bill thereafter. Since Barro
(2006) measures the risk free rate using 30-day treasury yields, I attempt to do the same.
However, unfortunately there was no such Treasury bill market in Sweden before the 1980s.
Consequently, Waldenstrom uses the discount rate as a proxy. The discount rate in Sweden
was an important market rate in the sense that banking law stipulated that commercial
banks had to follow it when setting their own borrowing and lending rates. The rates are
in nominal values, so to adjust the data for inflation I use the formula rft real = [(1 +
rft nominal) · (xt−1/xt)] − 1 with xt being the consumer price index (1980=100) of current
year t .To find the empirical risk-free rate, denoted rf , I calculate the arithmetic average
of inflation-adjusted short-run yields from 1920 through 2006 and find that rf = 0.022494,
which is 2.2494%.
I now have the returns re = 10.2289% and rf = 2.2494% to calculate re−rf : the empirical
equity premium. Therefore the empirical equity premium for Sweden is re–rf = 7.9795%.
The empirical equity premium, unlike the theoretical equity premium, represents the return
over riskless assets (bonds) investors require to compensate for risky assets (stocks) if they
anticipate rare disasters. Also, the empirical equity premium is roughly 10.96 times higher
than the theoretical equity premium. Figure 3 shows the annual equity premia trend from
1920-2006 along with total stock returns and real short-run riskless yields. The data suggests
that the equity premia per unit of time move procyclicaly with total stock returns and
there exists a small suggestion in the trend that the equity premia per unit of time move
countercyclicaly with riskless assets.
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Figure 3: Annual Equity Premia, 1920-2006
2.2 Empirical Compromises in Analysis
I need to note the empirical compromises I had to make in calculating the equity premium.
First, the equity premium should be the diﬀerence between the expected future total stock
returns and the return on riskless assets, i.e. E[re]−rr where E[·] is the expectation operator.
However, the historical equity premium, which I calculate above, suﬃces since it is diﬃcult
to obtain each investor’s expectation and I have historical statistics to calculate the equity
premium.
Additionally, periods of high inflation cause real returns of government bonds to become
negative. The 1970s is a prime example of the countercyclical pattern between real short-
run yields and inflation. To illustrate, the Stockholm Stock Exchange remained strong until
1977 even though government bonds were negative from 1970 until 1981, due to high inflation
rates during the 1970s. This high spread can lead to an overestimate of the equity premium.
My third concern with the empirical equity premium estimate is that it may be upward
biased. Starting in December 1918 a weekly Swedish financial chronicle Aﬀarsvarlden pub-
lished a composite stock price index that is now called AFGX. AFGX is a capital weighted
stock price index and up to 1998 only firms on the Stockholm Stock Exchange so called
A-list were weighted. Which firms were on the A-list is not mentioned in the documentation
Waldenstrom provides. However, since 1998 AFGX includes firms on the so-called O-list
containing previously unlisted firms. Therefore, the equity premium estimate may be biased
because it does not reflect losses or gains on investments incurred by unlisted firms. Never-
theless, withstanding the concerns with the empirical equity premium, I can now calculate
the set of rare disaster probabilities in Sweden.
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2.3 Rare Disaster Probabilities
I need to briefly mention how Taub’s (2007) distilled model departs from Barro’s (2006)
richer model. Most notably, Taub (2007) departs from Barro’s richer model by modifying
the stochastic process governing the growth of consumption. First, Taub does not mix the
ongoing shocks with the rare disasters. He starts over and in his distilled model the rare
disasters are the only exogenous shocks in the economy. Second, Taub does not allow the
extent of the rare disaster to be random. He assumes that when the rare disaster shocks the
economy, real output always contracts proportionally by the same magnitude, but he still
allows the shock to hit at a random time. Also, Taub ignores the probability of default on
government bonds. The Swedish government is stable so the default on bonds is neither a
concern of mine as well.
With Taub’s modifications in mind, the equity premium with rare disasters is seen as
re − rf = p[(1 − b)−γ − (1 − b)1−γ − b]. p is the hazard rate and captures the probability
per unit of time of a rare disaster event happening between 1919-2006. b is the proportion
that real output contracts if a rare disaster hits the economy. Barro argues that b is between
.25 and .5, which I use as given. Since I have the values of b, the value of re − rf , and
the conservative value γ = 4, I can calculate the unknown probability of a rare disaster.
Substituting b = .25 into the equation I get a probability p of 0.147735, which means there is
a 14.7735% annual probability that a rare disaster will shrink real output by 25%. However,
the implied probability of seeing a 25% GDP contraction in perpetuity is 1 − e−p, and this
equals 13.7340%. Next, substituting in b = .5 yields a probability p of 0.010639, which means
there is a 1.0639% annual probability that a rare disaster will shrink real output by 50%.
On the other hand, the implied probability of seeing a 50% GDP contraction in perpetuity
is 1− e−p, and this equals 1.0583%.
3 Discussion
3.1 Swedish Rare Disasters
The rare disaster events that I consider outside the events that Barro (2006) documents are
the Midsummer Crisis of 1941, the 1973 oil embargo, the Swedish financial crisis of the early
1990s, and I consider the US financial crisis of 2007, although this occurs outside the run of
my data.
To begin with, I had wondered if Sweden’s policy to remain neutral during World War II
would not produce any adverse economic eﬀects, which might declassify WWII as a rare dis-
aster in Sweden’s defense. After studying the data, I conclude that my hypothesis is wrong.
The long-standing policy of neutrality did not save Sweden from experiencing inauspicious
economic shocks during the war. In fact, seen in Figure 4, Sweden experienced a period
of lengthy stagflation between 1940 and 1942. For example, inflation in 1940 was 12.69%,
then in 1941 it had stayed at 12.41%, and finally lowered to 6.64% in 1942, which is still
high given the Rikbanks target of 2% per year. During the same time, real consumption
contracted -5.98% in 1940, -2.50% in 1941, and -1.35% in 1942.
What is most unexpected in the data is the trough in the growth trend seen in Figure
1 during World War II is much deeper than during the Great Depression. In fact, from
1929-1933 real consumption only declined in 1932 by 3.76%. The sharpest drop in real con-
sumption was in 1921 characterized by a 12.84% decline in real consumption from 1920.
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Figure 4: Annual Percent Change of Inflation and Real Consumption, 1919-2006
Additionally, the data on real imports suggests the war acted as an adverse supply shock
by reducing real imports all throughout the war period. For example, as seen in Figure 5
below, imports dropped 34.76% in 1940, dropped 30.40% in 1941, declined 0.50% in 1942
followed by a small increase in 1943, but continued to fall until 1945 when imports to
Sweden increased 113.47%. Also, the war contracted demand for Swedish iron ore and
timber products, for which Sweden is known even today. By the late 19th century, these
materials were being turned into increasingly advanced products, laying the groundwork for
a broad manufacturing sector that even today largely forms the base of the economy. Most
notably, high demand from Britain and the European continent internationalized Sweden’s
manufacturing sector, which expanded Sweden’s export sector.
However, the export activity that continues to drive the Swedish economy decreased along
with imports between 1940 and 1945 with a 5-year average decline in real exports during
World War II of -6.025%. On top of this, during the war period the Social Democratic
Party was in power, and their commitment to excessive regulation of the goods market can
partially explain the stagflation. Therefore, the contraction of inputs and the government
regulations helped feed the high inflation and low real consumption seen in Figure 4.
Additionally, during the World War II period, Sweden’s long-standing policy of neutrality
was tested in 1941 by the Germans. In June of 1941, at the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet
war, the Germans presented Sweden with a petition for a series of military concession in
what has come to be known as the Midsummer Crisis of 1941. The Swedish government
decided to grant Germany the request, and Sweden subsequently provided Hitler’s Third
Reich with several forms of logistical support by allowing armed Nazi troops transit across
Sweden (Scott, 2002).
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Figure 5: Annual Percent Change of Exports and Imports, 1919-2000
Whether or not Sweden’s concession to Germany was a conspicuous violation of their
tradition of neutrality remains controversial. However, the equity premia in my data say
otherwise about the Swedes’ expectation of World War II as a rare disaster. To illustrate, in
1940, before the Midsummer Crisis, the equity premium was -6.65%, yet in 1941 it sharply
increased to 28.95%, and remained at 26.50% in 1942. This increase in the equity premium
suggests that the Swedish investors were not fooled by their government’s political maneuver
because of rational expectations. As a result of the Midsummer Crisis of 1941, the data
suggests Swedes anticipated the remainder of World War II to develop into a rare disaster.
Another period of stagflation in Sweden’s economy occurred during the economic cri-
sis of the 1970s. First, the stagflation was essentially determined by over-accumulation of
capital and declining productivity growth, which was then exacerbated by the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo of 1973. However, the adverse
economic eﬀects of the oil shock reached Sweden in 1977 after some delay because Sweden
initially benefited from the raw materials boom of 1974-1976, which consisted of imports
of agricultural produce and minerals. However, from 1972 until 1981 real short-term yields
were consecutively negative, suggesting that inflation was extraordinarily high although the
Stockholm Stock Exchange remained strong until 1977, at which time total stock returns
dropped to -9.97% but which jumped back to 10.16% in 1978. These observations can bee
seen in Figure 3 and Figure 4. On top of this high inflation, the oil shock caused a structural
crisis with reference to the composition of the Swedish export sector (an important compo-
nent of Sweden’ GDP). The oil shock caused intense price competition among Swedish steel
export companies, which contributed to the deterioration of Sweden’s export performance
characterized by a 6.72% drop in 1975, a small 0.74% increase in 1976, followed by a 3.44%
decline in 1977. Because of the structural crisis, an uncompetitive export market, lack of
investment, and increasing foreign debt emerged. Consequently, the private sector was af-
fected and real consumption fell 1.68% in 1977 and meekly recovered with 0.83% growth in
1978 (refer to Figure 4). Also, the average equity premium from 1976 to 1980 was 9.38%,
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again which suggests Swedes anticipated the 1970’s crisis to emerge as a rare disaster.
To improve the functionality of the economy, Sweden’s government initiated the deregu-
lation of many sectors, including the financial service market, transportation markets, and
the electricity market. During the mid-1980s economic growth again rose, driven by high
export activity. The average growth in real consumption from 1984 to 1989 was 3.14%.
The deregulation of the credit market contributed to a very rapid increased in bank lending,
largely focused on the real estate sector. However, Sweden developed a banking and financial
market bubble early in 1990s. A restructuring of the tax system, in order to emphasize low
inflation combined with an international economic slowdown in the early 1990s, caused the
bubble to burst. Consequently, Sweden entered into the most severe recession it had seen
since the 1930s. Between 1990 and 1993 real consumption fell by an average 0.67%, with a
maximum decline in real consumption in 1993 of -2.11%. Also between 1990 and 1993 the
average total stock return on the Stockholm Stock Exchange was -7.40%.
Similar to events leading up to the US financial crisis, a rising stock market in the 1980s
with total stock returns of 51% in 1986 and 34.6% in 1989 induced a euphoric sense of wealth
among Swedish investors. Consequently, borrowers began to take out real estate loans at the
same time while newly deregulated banks provided these mortgages with highly favorable
terms with little or no credit evaluation. When home prices fell in 1990s, asset values on
banks’ balance sheets dropped reducing liquidity in the economy. Sweden was able to emerge
from the crisis with the rapid growth of the Information Technology sector.
The data on the equity premia during the financial crisis of the early 1990s suggest that
the Swedes anticipated this severe crisis as a rare disaster. For instance, in 1992, the equity
premium was -25.76%, a result of low yields on government bills and poor performance on
the Stockholm Stock Exchange. However, when the economy began to rebound in 1993, the
financial crisis was still fresh in the Swedish people’s memory and consequently the equity
premium shot up to 25.94% in only one year in the expectation of a future rare disaster. The
Swedish government was able to abate this fear through its successful bailout of insolvent
banks. Instead of just bailing out the banks with hordes of capital, the Swedish government
extracted equity from bank shareholders, thus holding the banks more accountable. When
the government sold the toxic assets, the profits flowed back to the Swedish taxpayers. In
contrast, the United States did not take action to extract equity from American banks as a
price for their costly bailout in 2008 (Dougherty, 2008).
3.2 Welfare and Policy Implications
Currently, I conjecture that future data on equity premia will show that the Swedes anticipate
the US financial crisis of 2007 to emerge as a rare disaster. Having been through a severe
liquidity crisis in the early 1990s, the Swedish people can expect the US financial meltdown
to be a rare disaster whether or not the current crisis fully matures into one, following our
assumption that a rare disaster contracts real output by 25%-50%. Nevertheless, because
the equity premium should be the expected rate of return on risky assets minus the rate of
return on riskless assets, it is reasonable to predict that the empirical equity premium that I
calculate is the best estimate of the future risk premium that the Swedes will require as the
Swedish economy heads towards a recession.
Furthermore, Johnasson (2008) quotes Lars Nyberg of the Riksbank saying that Sweden
is poorly prepared for the international eﬀects the US financial crisis will produce. He says
that any economic measures the Swedish government, which is now headed by a right-center
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alliance, and the Riksbank have taken to improve market conditions in Sweden will not stop
the financial crisis from hitting Sweden. On top of that, he says that despite the quite recent
experience of the crisis of the early 1990s, Swedish lawmakers have still not been able to
get a proper framework for the management and closure of ailing banks in place. Such a
framework is necessary to facilitate the quick and eﬃcient closure of banks at a low cost to
the deposit guarantee system (analogous to the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation),
while making shareholders and uninsured creditors bear the responsibility of their investment
decisions. In light of this, Sweden’s unpreparedness might raise the expected equity premium
above 7.97%.
The implications of the global harms of the United States financial crisis on the expected
equity premium will change future estimates of the probabilities p and magnitudes b of rare
disasters in Sweden. Currently, despite Sweden’s steady consumption growth sometimes
buﬀeted by stochastic perturbations like the 1973 oil embargo and the crisis in the early
1990s, a probability of 13.7340% of a rare disaster cutting real output by 25% in the future
is a warning sign that Sweden should carefully examine and execute its economic policies.
And while the historical data is there to substantiate a 50% drop in real output, the Swedish
government should be more concerned about preventing a 25% drop given its higher implied
probability.
Recall that Grant and Quiggin (2005) state that government intervention can be welfare
improving and that privitisation may reduce public welfare in the presence of high equity
premia. In 2006, the Swedish annual equity premium shot up to 25.55% reflecting investors’
antcipation that the US financial crisis might hit Sweden hard. This high value implicates
that while Sweden’s new conservative government continues its ongoing privitisation, they
should remain committed to preserving the country’s social welfare programs and to keeping
privitisation to a minimum in order to maintain stable public welfare. Keeping this policy
recommendation in mind however, the confluence of Sweden’s strong political credibility
mixed with its social economic policies like high tax burdens, close cooperation between
corporations and the government, and extant robust public sector can help Sweden aﬀord
the expensive cost of another high equity premium.
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